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The United States Military vs. the Media:
Constitutional Friction

I.

INTRODUCTION

The long history of the relationship between the military and the
media has been somewhat enigmatic. The fact that each institution has
a strong constitutional mandate for its operations necessarily implicates
the judiciary as a player in the inevitable conflict between the armed
forces and the press. Ironically, these three entities-the military,
media, and judiciary-frequently meet on the same First Amendment
battlefield. The purpose of this Comment is to discuss this relationship
historically and currently, assert the possible roles of each institution
generally and with respect to one another, and attempt to predict the
ebb and flow of the future relationship. Before discussing the specifics
of this triangular relationship and the impact that the courts should or
should not have on the relationship, one must first understand the
current general status of both the military and the media.
II.

CURRENT STATUS OF MuLITARY AND THE MEDIA

A

The Military
When Ronald Reagan assumed office, he made the refurbishment of
the military one of his top priorities. Whether one supports increases in
defense spending or not, most would agree that the financial and
ideological dedication to improving the military resulted in a better
fighting force. The evidence for this conclusion is reflected in the
militarily successful operations in Panama, Grenada, the Middle East,
and in the Persian Gulf in the war against Iraq.
Following Vietnam, the military had endured an incredible rate of
attrition in manpower, equipment, and expertise. This attrition was
similar to and different than similar drawdowns in force following each
preceding war in which the United States participated. Resources
declined, as America turned inward following a major conflict, much as
we had done following most of the major wars in our history. Unlike the
previous occasions, however, many lost their respect for the military as
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an institution-an attitude that resulted in an ideological abandonment
of the armed forces and the troops. Many Vietnam veterans were
castigated for their service in the military. This prevalent attitude
among the citizens and even the government further debilitated the
strength of the military. The overall weakness of the force became all
too evident in the wake of such disasters as the hostage rescue attempt
in Iran. That debacle demonstrated that the military was unprepared
to handle important and relevant operations. Red McDaniel, retired
Navy captain and president of the American Defense Institute, noted
that the "failed Iranian hostage rescue was the culmination of poor
training, poor equipment and poor morale after Vietnam."' As a result,
when the nation called upon the military to perform, it did not have the
leadership, manpower or technology to effectively project force overseas.
The election of President Reagan in 1980 coincided with the rise to
prominence and power of some dedicated military leaders such as
Generals Powell, Schwarzkopf, Waller, et al., who had persevered
through hard times, having entered the military as young platoon
leaders and company commanders during Vietnam. These men
understood the role and the nature of the military and knew how to best
train and utilize the armed forces. They had learned valuable lessons
from their Vietnam experience and put those lessons into practice. They
upgraded and streamlined the force both from a technological and
human standpoint. This improvement most likely also contributed
meaningfully to the United States victory over the Russians in the Cold
War. In addition, actual usage of the military resulted in highly
effective and efficient operations. The new leadership was superb, and
technology resulting in smart bombs, patriot missiles and MIAl Abrams
Tanks demonstrated that President Reagan's investment in the military
was money well spent-at least from the military's perspective.
The armed forces are currently experiencing dangerous levels of
cutbacks in money and manpower, as well as an increasing amount of
controversial missions that have nothing to do with what has historically
been the sole task of military training-to fight and win wars.
Peacekeeping and relief missions do not reflect the type of individual
and unit combat skills and roles that are the ordinary focus of military
training.' Ironically, even as the Clinton Administration attempts to

1. McDaniel, Don't Slash Defense Budget, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1993, at 10A.
2. Interestingly, the co-winner of the 1991 National Defense University's Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition was Air Force Lt. Colonel Charles
Dunlap, who wrote a science fiction story about the U.S. military's future. Heritage
Features, The Next Military Mission: Social Work? North Canton Sun, Oct. 13, 1993 at 2.
In his essay, Lt. Col. Dunlap creates a frightening scenario of a future battle with Iran:
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expand the role of the military to include peacekeeping and relief
missions, the military has been subjected to further cuts (or decreasing
increases) in its budget and reductions in personnel.3
Recent news regarding the dangerously low levels of readiness in
certain army divisions legitimizes the concerns raised by military
leaders, as Bill Clinton and the Congress have made further cuts in the
defense budget. Red McDaniel notes, "Moving hastily and recklessly

When Iranian armies started pouring into the lower Gulf states in 2010, the U.S.
armed forces were ready to do anything but fight. People in the military no longer
considered themselves warriors. Instead they perceived themselves as policemen,
relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians-everything
but war fighters. When these philanthropists met the Iranian 10th Armed Corps
near Daharan during the Second Gulf War, they were brutally slaughtered by a
military which had not forgotten what militaries were supposed to do or what war
is really about.
Id. It is commonly understood that:
The sole purpose of military power is to deter aggression and ... fight to the
death to defend U.S. lives and security interests. As the Gulf War clearly showed,
the demise of the Soviet Union does not mean America no longer needs soldiers
whose mission is to defeat an enemy as quickly and decisively as possible.
Id.
3. For example, as of January 31, 1995, the armed forces had approximately 100,000
fewer troops on active duty than the previous year. ARMY TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1995 at 24. The
Clinton Administration's goal is to have 700,000 fewer troops than 1988 by 1999. Id. The
ultimate result of cutbacks is that the army, for instance, will be reduced to 10 divisions
and less than 500,000 troops. ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY NEws SPECIAL
REPORT, The Future of the Army, 1994 at 1A.
In addition, according to General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, the amount
devoted to research and development in the 1996 budget is $4 billion less than what is
necessary annually to modernize equipment and weapons. Too Little Money in '96 Budget
for Modernization,ARMY TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995 at 16. Defense spending as a share of the
Gross Domestic Product has dropped to approximately 3% while social spending has
increased to over 15% Supportingthe Force: The IndustrialBase and Defense Conversion,
THE OFFICER, Dec., 1993 at 28-29.
Army landpower experts such as General Jack N. Merritt (ret.) and former Army Chief
of Staff General Carl Vuono (ret.), agreed that the "administration must stop putting the
Army in the position of having to choose between modernization and personnel." AUSA
NEws SPECIAL REPORT at 2A. Further, these experts also noted that "the decades-old habit
of robbing Peter to pay Paul-taking money from operations and maintenance accounts...
to pay for peacekeeping operations in places such as Somalia-was sliding the service
toward the 'Hollow Force' dilemma of the late 1970s." Id.
Already the military is being expected to have the capability to fight two major regional
conflicts simultaneously. Id. at 3A. To further expand the miltary's role while attempting
to dramatically reduce its resources seems a foolish idea. In light of this situation, the
military professionals believe that the active-duty army should consist of at least 12
divisions and 560,000 soldiers in order to "meet peacekeeping and peacemaking
requirements and also be able to fight and win the two major regional conflicts as called
for in the 'Bottom-Up Review.'" Id. at 2A.
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ignores all the lessons history has taught us about the steep price paid
for raiding the defense budget in times of geopolitical transforination."
Citing World War II, Korea, and Iran as examples, McDaniel further
states that history's lesson boils down to one axiom: "Weakness invites
aggression." Military officers will recall their military history lessons
about the fate of Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War.
Due to the dramatic drawdown in force following World War H, Task
Force Smith had to meet the Communists' tanks with anti-tank shells
that literally bounced off the modem armor employed by the opposition's
tanks. United States' soldiers might as well have been throwing rocks.
In order to avoid another Task Force Smith, the military continues to
fight for the funding necessary to modernize the force, train the troops,
and implement new systems such as the Comanche helicopter, F-22
aircraft, and military satellite technology.
B.

The Media
Like the military, the media plays a vitally important role in the
functioning of America's democratic system. This function highlights the
need for the media to conduct its activities in a responsible fashion.
While media power has always been evident,' the advent of modem
printing and broadcasting methods has had an inevitable impact on the
media's potency. Some assert that the media is actually a fourth branch
of government with power even beyond that of the other three branches
because of its extraordinary ability to reach masses of diverse people on
such a large scale.7 The fact that the First Amendment arguably

4. McDaniel, supra note 1, at 10A.
5. Id. Former President Reagan, insisting that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

or "Star Wars" is still needed in this volatile world, stated: "'Ifthe... administration in
Washington thinks we are no longer at risk, they need to open their eyes and take a long,

hard look at the world.'" Reagan Says That SDI is Still Needed, THE O cER, July, 1993
at 26.
Commenting upon President Clinton's actions in deterring a new Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, asserted that
this "success depended on American military strength-which is steadily declining. I hope
Clinton understands that continued reductions in American military power will undermine
his credibility as quickly in the world as on the playground." Clinton's'Successes' Suspect,
THE MACON TELEGRAPH, Nov. 1, 1994, at 6A.
6. Martin Linsky notes that the media was originally considered to be a part of the
government. LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 13-14

(1986).

To illustrate this point, Linsky points to the fact that Thomas Jefferson and

Alexander Hamilton created the National Gazette and the Gazette of the United States,

respectively, to promulgate their philosophies. Id.
7. WALTER H. ANNENBERG, IMPACT OF MASS MEDIA: CURRENT ISSUES, The Fourth
Branch of Government, at 235 (Ray E. Hiebert & Carol Reuss eds., 2d ed. 1988). But see
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requires no accountability by the media to the people underscores the
potential for unhealthy control and domination."
Theargument rages on about just what role and how much power the
mass media does have. Obviously, the media fulfills the vital function
of encouraging public debate and checking government abuses." In a
nation that was founded at least partially on the principle of freedom
from oppressive or tyrannical government control, a strong argument
exists that the media must have significant strength." On the other
hand, the fact remains that the media is really the only entity that has
the daily capacity to control on a large scale what citizens know and how
a story is presented to them.11
The general lack of a visible and explicit check on media power can
result in abuse.' Media entities with their own agendas can wield the

J.C. MERRILL, THE IMPERATIVE OF FREEDOM: A PHIOSOPHY OF JOURNALISTIC AUTONOMY

(1974). Merrill believes that "the concept of the whole press as being a 'fourth branch of
government' is no more than a fine sounding myth." Id. at 117.
8. Id. Apparently, media irresponsibility did not deter the Founding Fathers from
safeguarding the freedom of the press. According to Lucas A. Powe, Jr., "the framers knew
a partisan and scurrilous press, not a fair one." LA. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND
THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 278 (1991).
9. Merrill, supra note 7, at 115-19.
10. JA. BARRON, PUBLIC RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE PRESS (1981). According to Barron,
"media power is not a curse but a blessing. The enduring foe ... is the government. A
The press should be powerful because the
powerful enemy merits a worthy foe ....
purpose of press power is to curb the rising power of government." Id. at 183. However,
Barron also warns that potential also exists for media abuse of power depending on the
interpretation of the First Amendment-a situation that necessarily implicates the
judiciary. Id. at 184.
11. For example, Maxwell McCombs reports on a study done of presidential speeches
over a ten year period in which he discovered that a mere eight percent of every broadcast
constituted the actual speech of the president, while the rest of the broadcast was devoted
to varying types of media 'analysis." Maxwell E. McCombs, Explorers and Surveyors:
Expanding Strategiesfor Agenda.SettingResearch, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 813, 819 (1992).
12. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations states:
I think that a kind of self-indulgence has arisen in our media along with the
concentration of media power, and that the self-indulgence relates especially to the
use of anonymous informants-"highly placed sources," "icials,"well-informed
persons," adiplomats," "State Department Offlicials,--all those anonymous
categories of people whom we read quoted day in and day out. They are not
accountable for the accuracy or inaccuracy of what they say either, but somehow
the cumulative impact of the accounts of all these very self-interested, anonymous
persons is very large, shaping the conception of political reality, which in turn
shapes the responses of American voters.
AND THATS THE WAY IT IS(N T): A REFERENCE GUIDE TO MEDIA BIAS xi, xv (L. Brent
Bozell I & Brent H. Baker eds., 1990).
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power to affect public discourse on a particular issue.13 Jeane Kirkpatrick, former United States ambassador to the United Nations noted that
"with the rise of electronic media, the possibility of deliberate manipulation of culture has been magnified ten zillion fold."14 A recent survey
of governmental policymakers reflects the sobering nature of the
potential impact of that power."5 In that survey, 96% of those governmental officials interviewed said that the media has an effect on
policymaking; over one-half believed that the influence exerted by the
media was substantial.'6 By extension, it follows that such influence
affects not only the nature of the debate on public issues but also the
outcome."7
The natural result of this recognition is the inevitable complaints by
various individuals and groups about bias among the dominant media
culture. Several studies demonstrate that a large number of individuals,
especially when they are part of a cognizable social group, are more

13. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State., DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA (Judith
Lichtenberg ed. 1990) at 14243. Owen notes that, "Terror comes in many forms. The
powers of the FCC and CBS differ... but there is no reason to assume that one kind of
power will be more inhibiting or limiting of public debate than the other." Id. Further,
Fiss asserts that "owners and managers of the media could use their power to protect
themselves" and their supporters within the government. Id. at 142.
14. AND THAT's THE WAY IT IS(N'T): A REFERENCE GUIDE TO MEDIA BIAS, xi (L. Brent
Bozell III & Brent H. Baker, eds. 1990).
15. M. Linsky, supra note 6, at 69.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 114.
By exercising control over the nation's agenda-picking and choosing which issues
are fit for public debate, which news is "fit to print"-the news media can greatly
influence the political direction of the country. They can ignore or ridicule some
ideas and promote others. They can wreck a politician's career by taking a quote
or two out of context or by spotlighting a weakness in his background. They can
make winners look like losers and vice versa, knowing that, in the political world,
appearance easily supplants reality.
AND THAT'S THE WAY IT IS(N'r): A REFERENCE GUIDE TO MEDIA BIAs, 8 (L. Brent Bozell
III & Brent H. Baker eds., 1990). For a contrary view of media power, see C. PRESS & K.
VERBURG, AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND JOuRNALISTs (1988). Press and Verburg quote
former CBS commentator Eric Sevareid:
I have never quite grasped the worry about the power of the press. After all, it
speaks with a thousand voices, in constant dissonance. It has no power to arrest
you, draft you, tax you, or even make you fill out a form, except a subscription
form if you're agreeable. It is the power of government that has increased.
Politicians have come to power in many countries and put press people in jail. I
can't think of any place where the reverse has occurred.
Id. at 61.
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critical of media reporting."' A Gallup study indicates that 53% of the
respondents believe that the media "favors one side" of a story while 45%
stated that the media is "politically biased [or motivated] in their
reporting."1 9
The most curious offshoot of complaints about the media's veracity has
been the rise of talk radio, a medium which is generally dominated by
conservatives such as Rush Limbaugh, Michael Reagan, and G. Gordon
Liddy. The extraordinary success of these individuals and the relative
lack of similarly successful liberal commentators may indicate that the
conservative citizens feel disenfranchised and silenced by what they
perceive to be a liberal media that is out of touch with the average
American. Limbaugh's book, The Way Things Ought to Be, with over 2.5
million copies in print, is the second best selling nonfiction book of all
time behind Lee Iaccoca's book.2 The number of radio stations that
carry his daily program has increased from 56 in 1988 to 622 by the end
of 1993.21 The number of listeners per week increased from 260,000 in
1988 to 18 million by the end of 1993.' These are numbers that merit
analysis. Limbaugh himself states that "the press and the government
are part of a Washington culture that's out of touch with reality, and has
[sic] no idea how people in America really live."' On the other hand,
President Clinton has remarked that "[tihe Republicans and the far
right in this country
have their own media networks. We don't have
24
anything like that."
Still, conservatives, who do most of the complaining about media bias,
contend that the rare conservative journalists openly profess their
ideological philosophies and do not "pretend" to be objective reporters of
the news-simply because most of them are commentators, not reporters.
Meanwhile, conservatives contend, the general media establishment
made up of large conglomerate print media like The New York 71mes,
The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune, 71me, and Newsweek, as
well as the network news organizations at CBS, ABC, NBC, and CNN,
contain reporters who claim to be neutral and objective but actually are
not.' Conservatives assert that media bias is evident in the personal

18. Albert L. Gunther, Biased Press or Biased Public?: Attitudes Toward Media
PUB. OPINION Q. 147, 150 (1992).
19. Carl S. Stepp, Access in a Post-Social Responsibility Age, DEMOCRACY AND THE
MASS MEDIA 192-93 (Judith Lichtenberg ed. 1990).
20. THE LIMBAUGH LETTER, Oct. 1993, at 8.
21. Id.

Coverage of Social Groups, 56

22. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
24. THE LIMBAUGH LETTER, Sept. 1994, at 3.
25. Id.
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editiorial remarks made by reporters, the choice of stories that are aired
or printed, the lack of commitment to truly presenting both sides to an
issue, and rote acceptance without questioning of the liberal party line.
Limbaugh cites two examples.' L. Brent Bozell, III, director of the
Media Research Center, states that "[tihe media by definition are biased.
As study after study has shown, there is a strong liberal tilt.' a Despite
these contentions, journalists themselves continue to proclaim objectivity.s Ultimately, many would affirm Justice Frankfurter's statement

26. Id. at 4, 16. Example number 1:
Take the homeless, for example. In May [19941, Sonya Ross of the Associated
Press reported: "Government officials estimate that 7 million Americans are
homeless, far more than the Census calculations of 600,000 people and far too
many, they say, for current federal programs to help adequately." Folks, objective
study after study (see Christopher Jencks'... book THE HOMELESS... ) has shown
the Census Bureau figure is correct. But don't expect journalists to do their own
digging on this.
Id. at 16. Example number 2:
If the members of the mainstream media are so unaffected by their liberalism,
then how do they explain their willingness to accept, without challenge, false
information and statistics fed to them by left-wing interest groups.... Christina
Hoff Summers catalogues in her... book, WHO STOLE FEMINIsM? the wholesale
acceptance of statistics fed to the media by militant feminist advocacy
groups--statistics that turn out to be utterly without foundation. The "study" that
supposedly proved more women were beaten on Super Bowl Sunday than any
other day, for example. Turned out to be a complete myth. Or the "report" that
purported to prove that tens of thousands of women died each year from anorexia
....
Another myth. Neither statistic turned out to have any basis in fact
whatsoever, and yet, because they fit neatly into the world view of the left (that
our society is evil, sexist, oppressive), they were repeated without independent
confirmation and without skepticism.
Id. at 4, 16. Meanwhile, proponents of the left would argue that Limbaugh is prone to
make similar mistakes. For instance, one report by a self proclaimed media watchdog
group recently published a list of Limbaugh's mistakes. The list was widely circulated in
the nation's newspapers, but in a twist that seems to support Limbaugh's argument, very
few of those same papers chose to print Limbaugh's itemized response to those allegations.
According to Limbaugh, he released a full-page substantive response to The Washington
Post, which had asked for his reaction, but the Post only ran one sentence of that response.
Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 6. One such study is the Lichter Survey, conducted by Robert Lichter, Linda
Lichter, and Stanley Rothman in 1986. Among other eyebrow raising facts, the Lichter
Survey showed that the proportion of leading repoters and journalists who support a
Democratic presidential candidate in any given year never drops below 80 percent. Id. at
3.
28. Id. at 4. Herbert J. Gans asserts in JOuRNALISM REVIEw, Are U.S. Journalists
Dangerously LiberalF, that "(plersonal political beliefs are left at home, not only because
journalists are trained to be objective and detached, but also because their credibility and
their paychecks depend on their remaining detached." Id.
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that "freedom of the press... is not an end in itself but a means to the
end of a free society.'
IH. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY-JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIP
Generally, the relationship between the military and the federal courts
has been harmonious. The courts have historically implemented a policy
of considerable deference to the internal operating structure and decision
making capacity of the armed forces. For example, in Orloff v.
Willoughby, ° the Supreme Court noted that "[oirderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
intervene in judicial matters."
The Court declared in Gilligan v.
2 that "it is difficult
Morgan"
to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle,
and professional decisions as to the ... control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments, subject ALWAYS to civilian
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.'
Another case,
Goldman v. Weinberger," resulted in declarations such as, "[Clourts
must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
interest.'
One controversy involving the military and free speech
provisions of the First Amendment, Greer v. Spock," resulted in the
Court's comment: "One of the very purposes for which the Constitution
was.., established was to 'provide for the common defence, 7 and this
Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special
constitutional function of the military in our national life, a function

29. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
30. 345 U.S. 83 (1953). The Court concluded that a physician did not have a right to
be commissioned. Id. at 90.
31. Id. at 94.
32. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court considered the issue of whether a suit in a federal
district court requesting an examination of the training, weapons and orders of a state's
National Guard would violate Congress' constitutional power over the militia granted by

Article I, Section 8, clause 16. Id- at 4.
33. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
34. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Court ruled that the First Amendment argument would
not sustain a Jewish servicemember's challenge to the Air Force uniform regulation that
prohibited the wearing of his yarmulke because the Air Force regulated evenhandedly. Id.
at 510.
35. Id. at 510.
36. 424 U.S. 828 (1975). The Court upheld a Fort Dix regulation prohibiting political
speeches, distributions of literature, or political demonstrations on post-leaving these
matters to the discretion of the post commander. Id at 840.
37. Id. at 837 (quoting U.S. CONST. Preamble).
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both explicit and indispensable."38 In Rostker v. Goldberg,8 ' the
Supreme Court reversed the district court's opinion, which held that the
Selective Service's exclusivity with respect to males was unconstitutional, by saying that the lower court was "quite wrong in undertaking an
independent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of CONGRESS' evaluation of that
evidence."'
Further, the Court noted that "[t]his is not, however,
merely a case involving the customary deference accorded congressional
decisions. The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over
national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has
the Court accorded Congress greater deference." 1 Declaring that the
congressional constitutional power to raise and support armies is "broad
and sweeping,"' 2 the Court concluded that "the lack of competence on
the part of the courts is marked" with respect to this area. 4
The federal courts have not, however, completely removed themselves
from issues involving military affairs. Even in Rostker, where the
Supreme Court ultimately decided to accord the ordinary deference, then
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, still stated that the
Court should not ignore the Constitution just because a particular case
happened to involve the military." On the other hand, he noted that
the Constitution explicitly limits the Judiciary's role with respect to the
military' The Chief Justice's statement demonstrates that the Court
will not go so far as to pass altogether on considering all cases concerning the military and declare them to be political questions, as some have
occasionally suggested.
The lower federal courts have been more bold in disregarding the
deference ordinarily afforded the military by the Supreme Court. The
district courts and courts of appeals have even intervened in military
policies regarding the qualifications of its personnel-an area left
virtually untouched by the Supreme Court, which rightfully recognizes
its inability to determine the fitness of a particular individual to serve
in the military. For example, due to pressure from interest groups,
lower courts sought to open the door for the eventual introduction of

38. Greer, 424 U.S. at 837.
39. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The Selective Service Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment
with respect to the Act's provisions excluding females. Id. at 78-79.
40. Id. at 82-83.
41. Id. at 64-65.
42. Id. at 65 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
43. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65.
44. Id. at 67.
45. Id.
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Thus, the future of the militaryhomosexuals into open service.'
judiciary relationship appears muddled for now, especially in light of the
potentially growing liberalism on the Supreme Court with the recent
additions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
IV. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP
The tension between the military and the media exists due to the very
nature of both. Military operations rely on secrecy and surprise as two
fundamental tenets of successful warfare. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese
warrior/strategist/philosopher, asserted that the "formation and
procedure used by the military should not be divulged beforehand. 7
He also urged commanders to "[a]ttack when they [the enemy] are
unprepared, make your move when they do not expect it." United
States military officers still learn that surprise is an important principle
of war.

A free press, on the other hand, generally pursues the goal of
informing the public about ALL of the news-attempting to ferret out any
efforts to maintain secrecy. Occasionally, the media is able to practice
some self discipline and yield to the interests of the greater good that
would be served by postponing or cancelling a report about events of a
sensitive nature. Unfortunately, however, this sort of self restraint has
become increasingly rare in the face of high ratings pressure.
A.

The Civil War
Some tension between the media and the military became evident
during the Civil War, due in large measure to the nature of the
conflict-an internal bitter struggle. Because the nation broke apart for
the duration of hostilities, the ordinary standard operating procedures
inside and outside of the military descended into chaos. Efforts to
restrict the press were largely nonexistent and when it was tried, it was
ineffective. The press generally had free reign in access to battlefields.
Photographers plied their new trade by snapping gruesome pictures of
the dead left behind. According to Joseph J. Mathews:

46. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For a critical analysis of that
decision, see Neff, Steffan v. Aspin: A Court'sUnfortunateReading of ReasonablenessOut
of the Military's Sensible Ban on Homosexuals, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1123 (1994). Since the
original decision by a three judge panel at the D.C. Court of Appeals, the court reheard the
case en banc. The earlier decision was reversed, and Steffan did not receive a commission
or reinstatement to the Naval Academy.
47. SuN Tzu. THE ART OF WAR 55 (T. Cleary trans. 1988).
48. Id. at 54.
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The war found the North American press unhampered by any legal or
traditional restrictions on military news.... Not until February 1862,
when with congressional authorization the President placed all
telegraph lines under military supervision, were measures of any
genuine effectiveness adopted. Even then there was no prepublication
control of information sent by couriers or by the mail.0
Spanish-American War
The freedom enjoyed by the press during the Civil War continued
mostly unabated during the Spanish-American War. Not only did press,
members join the troops on the front lines and report sensational details
of the battles, they also published troop movements and locations.'
The limited efforts to control publications of sensitive military operations
failed. 1 In addition, as M.L. Stein notes, the health, welfare and safety
of members of the media often depended upon the good graces of the
soldiers themselves, who occasionally offered parts of their rations to
feed the starving reporters unable to procure food from the understocked
commissaries.' This relationship probably served as the most effective
restraint against the media, many of whom owed the soldiers their lives
and would be less likely to print anything that might harm their
protectors and providers.
B.

World War I
The American press ran into its first major reporting restrictions in
the First World War, and both the American military and European
governments imposed the restrictions." Battlefield access was particularly rare in the beginning, and news reports were highly censored."
In fact, all news correspondents in Europe were required to be accredited, a status which was revoked if a particular reporter violated
C.

49. J. MATHEWS, REPORTING
50.

THE

WARS 81-82 (1957).

M.L. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF THE AMRIcAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS 45

(1968).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 46.
53. See Short & Pope, History and Scope of the Press' Right of Access to Foreign
Battlefields, 41 NAVLR 1, 3 n.11 (1993); STEIN, supra note 50, at 63-64; and MATHEWS,
8upra note 49, at 159. According to both Stein and Mathews, some reporters were arrested
as spies. Id.
54. See Short & Pope, supra note 53, at 3; and Seay, Remote Sensing: The Media, the
Military and the National Security Establishment-A FirstAmendment Time Bomb, 59
JALC 239 (1993).
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publication rules or accreditation standards." As the war progressed,
however, these tight restrictions on reporters loosened to the point that
some of them were permitted to accompany troops into the trenches and
into battle, and the government also decreased frontline censorship.'
Ultimately, the United States government issued domestic regulations
of censorship which were voluntarily followed by the press."7 These
regulations requested, but did not command, that the press maintain
secrecy regarding military movements, locations, troop numbers, and
port embarkation or debarkation locations.'
At the same time,
Congress refused to implement into the Espionage Act of 1917 a
provision which would have given the President the power to censure
publication of information relating to national security.,9
D.

World War II
The freedoms of access and publication the press began to enjoy in the
latter stages of World War I carried over into World War II, perhaps the
greatest example of a trusting media-military partnership in the history
of the United States. Each side compromised and made concessions that
led to peaceful coexistence. For the media's part, reporters voluntarily
submitted to censorship measures of the government.' The government, after establishing an Office of Censorship;"1 a Code of Wartime
Practices, which requested the newspapers to self censor sensitive
information;'m and continuing a practice of media accreditation, allowed

55. See Short & Pope, supra note 53, at 3 n.12; and Cassell, Restrictions on Press
Coverageof Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada,and "'Off-the-RecordWars,'
73 GEO. LJ. 931, 937 (1985). According to Cassell, in order to receive accreditation, a
reporter was required to appear personally before the Secretary of War; swear to report
truthfully and refrain from reporting anything which might assist the enemy; submit a
handwritten resume and statement of his intentions in Europe; remit a $1,000 fee to the
Army and post a $10,000 bond which guaranteed good behavior, and wear a green armband
with a red "C." Id.
56. Short & Pope, supra note 53, at 3; and STEIN, supra note 50, at 73.
57. Short & Pope, supra note 53, at 3.
58. Id. at 3 n.15; Requests for Censorship by Press of Certain War News, Official Bull.,
Dec. 31, 1917 at 10; and H. NELsON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE

WARREN COURT 250-53 (1967).
59. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 734 (1971) (White, J.
concurring).
60. Short & Pope, supra note 53, at 4 n.16, 19; P. KNIGHTLY, THE FIRST CASUALTY:
FROM THE CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR CoRRESPoNDEzNT As HERO, PROPAGANDIST, AND
MYTH MAKER 275 (1975).
61. Exec. Order No. 8985, 6 Fed. Reg. 6625 (1941).
62. Office of Censorship, U.S. Gov't, Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press
2-6 (1942).
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reporters almost unlimited freedom of movement (even to the front lines)
and access to soldiers and military leaders.' These measures proved
extremely effective and did not dramatically hamper news reporting
efforts. The media did an excellent job in helping to galvanize public
support for the war effort. Meanwhile, the military was able to
effectively safeguard vital secrets like D-Day, the atomic bomb, and the
breaking of Japanese communication codes.
E. Korean War
At the inception of the Korean War, the friendly relationship between
the military and the press that existed during World War II continued.
The media began by voluntarily censoring its own publications rather
than submitting to compulsory government censorship." Gradually,
military leadership became disenchanted with the stories printed and
aired to the public, fearing that the media divulged important sensitive
military information.' As a result, military commanders like General
MacArthur expelled reporters and increased censorship." According
to one reporter, these censorship measures meant a "you-write-what-youlike-and-well-shoot-you-if-we-don't-like-it" system.' For the first time,
significant hostility began to develop between the military and the press,
a situation which would later dramatically complicate American efforts
in Vietnam.
F

Vietnam War
The Vietnam War marked perhaps the greatest liberalization of media
restrictions by the military. The media received unencumbered
battlefield access, no domestic censorship, voluntary censorship in
Vietnam, and looser accreditation standards." In return, the media
had to agree that it would not reveal highly sensitive military information such as troop location and movement." Interestingly, the real

63.

Cassell, supra note 55, at 939; Frenmick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield.

A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Press Access to Military Operationsin Grenada,.Panamaand
the PersianGulf, 23 PAC. L.J. 315, 319 (1992).

64. Cross & Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military Operations, 21
SUFFOLK U. L. REV.989, 1000 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Homonoff, The FirstAmendment and NationalSecurity: The Constitutionality of Press Censorshipand Acces8 Denial in Military Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J. INTL L.
& POL.369, 379 (1985). Homonoff notes that the press prematurely reported the Army's
withdrawal to the Natkong river, revealing various strategic troop locations. Id.
66. Id.
67. KNIGHTLY, supra note 60, at 337.
68. Homonoff, supra note 65, at 379.
69. Id.
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media battle occurred as the younger reporters began responding to
personal beliefs in opposition to the war effort. Reports became
increasingly cynical, and military officials as well as older reporters who
recalled the "good old days" of World War II cooperation urged these
younger reporters to become "part of the team." 70 Tensions continued
to rise on both sides, as the media responded to increasing pressures at
home and fueled the fire with negative stories and disturbing pictures
reflecting distrust of the military and the government. 71 The government did not help matters by painting a falsely rosy picture of the war.
Each side bore some responsibility for the deterioration of the relationship.
G. GrenadaInvasion
The military, believing after Vietnam that the media was merely
another obstacle to the successful conclusion of military campaigns,
decided to severely restrict and in fact prohibit press access to the
battlefield during the invasion of Grenada.7 2 Several members of the
press, upon learning of the invasion, attempted to bypass these Pentagon
regulations to reach the island and were thwarted and detained. 7 The
entire operation, which only took two days, had occurred in secrecy
before the media learned of it. After the military secured the island and
ensured that it was safe, the Department of Defense allowed in several
journalists with a military escort for a few hours.7 It would be almost
a week before reporters were allowed to enter the island unescorted.'
President Reagan justified the press limitations on the basis of secrecy
and safety.7 Out of these restrictive media policies arose litigation
that accomplished nothing in the way of establishing a firm policy'

70.

See, e.g., Knightly, supra note 60, at 382; D. MINOR, THE INFORMATION WAR 6, 11

(1970).
71. Cross & Griffin, supra note 64, at 1003.
72. Id. at 1004; Cassell, supra note 55, at 943..
73. Cassell, supra note 55, at 944. Contrary to some hysterical reports, the detained
reporters enjoyed a pleasant day eating sweet rolls and drinking coffee in the officers'
wardroom. They had attempted to board a helicopter that was to be a part of the raid.
H.N. SCHWARZKOPF, IT DOESN'T TAKE A HERO 297-98 (1992).
74. Cassell, supra note 55, at 944.
75. Id.; Cross & Griffin, supra note 64, at 1005.
76. Frenznick, supra note 63, at 323 n.56.
77. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Flynt sued the Secretary of
Defense in an attempt to overturn the restrictive access policy implemented by the military
in Grenada. Flynt sought declarative and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the
press' First Amendment right to gather news. Id. at 135. After the district court denied
relief, the court of appeals affirmed, stating that the action was moot and refusing to
comment on the merits of the plaintiffs position. Id.
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H. The Sidle Commission
After Grenada, the Pentagon appointed retired General Winant K.
Sidle, who had served as head of the military information office in
Saigon during the Vietnam War, to lead a commssion to study journalists' access, per the media's request.7" Some of the Sidle Commission's
recommendations included conducting public relations planning
simultaneously with operations planning;, establishing the largest
possible pools of reporters to witness operations; fostering an environment encouraging voluntary media compliance with military press
regulations; allowing the Secretary of Defense to decide whether to
create a pool of accredited reporters; providing communications facilities
and transportation to the media when possible; and implementing
educational programs to foster an understanding environment. 79 The
media agreed to follow these guidelines, which were generally received
favorably."s
I. Panama Invasion
In 1989, the military and media attempted to test the new policy
promulgated by the Sidle Commission during the invasion of Panama
that was engineered to oust Manuel Noriega from power. Press pools
arrived soon after the fighting commenced but were unable to gain
access to the areas of operation until one day after the hostilities
began.8" The military, therefore, had not completely adhered to the
Commission's standards, exhibiting the reluctance born of having been
burned by the press in Vietnam.
J.

The Persian Gulf War
During the Persian Gulf War, the military followed the Sidle
Commission regulations, albeit not in the manner envisioned by the
Commission. For instance, the armed forces never disbanded the press
pools, despite the Commission's intention that the pools would be a2
temporary measure utilized only in the beginning of operations.8
Media members never went unescorted and many stories were censored." During the conflict, the media rarely outwardly protested the

78. Cassell, supra note 55, at 945.
79. Id. at 946.
80. Id.
81. Frenznick, supra note 63, at 325.
82. E. Hickey, Newshounds Howl on a Short Leash, INSIGHT ON THE NEws, Mar. 11,
1991, at 56.
83. Id
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M An overwhelming
manner of the implementation of the guidelines."
majority of the American public, perhaps feeling guilty about the
treatment received by Vietnam veterans, rallied around the troops and
the war effort. Thus, the media became careful about criticizing military
leaders, and most citizens agreed with the premise of strict media
restrictions in the theater of operations. Ironically, most individuals now
began questioning the integrity of the media rather than the military,
which was rightfully receiving high confidence marks in public opinion
polls.'
The media contributed to this phenomenon by airing press
conferences depicting highly efficient and professional leadership in the
T M In their
military and a corresponding ignorance among journalists.
zealous attempts to get ratings and juicy stories, reporters became
pawns of both sides."7
The United States, seizing the high ground of morality in conjunction
with Coalition forces, won an overwhelming victory in this arena.
Negative press stories about the Coalition from an Iraqi perspective
proved patently false and ridiculous, as U.S. military leaders easily
demonstrated. Meanwhile the media, which attempted to take great
measures in establishing a policy of "neutrality," unwittingly played into
the U.S. military's hands by airing these apparently favorable stories
about Iraq that any sensible journalist should have recognized as being
suspicious and implausible. Although these propaganda tactics by
Saddam Hussein appeared to be a rational ploy in light of the publicized
hostility between the press and the military, the Iraqis failed to

84. But see Nation Magazine v. Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). Plaintiffs claimed that the pooling regulations unconstitutionally hampered their
ability to gather news by restricting access to the battlefield. Id. at 1561. The court
declined to grant injunctive or declaratory relief because claims were moot. Id. at 1575.
85. According to Gallup polls during this period, the media received high confidence
ratings from only 34.5% and 28%for television and newspaper reporters, respectively. G.
Gallup & F. Newport, M.D., Confidence in Major U.S. InstitutionsatAlltime Low, GALLUP
POLL MONTHLY, Oct. 1991 at 36-37. On the other hand, high confidence ratings for the
military reached an almost unprecedented peak of 77%, making the military the institution
having the highest level of public confidence. Id. at 37.
86. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was determined not to repeat the problems
encountered by 'stonewalling" the media during the Grenada invasion. SCHWARZKOPF,
supra note 73, at 398. General Schwarzkopf also notes that the U.S. Central Command
interceded on behalf of the American press after the Saudis requested that all reporters
leave. Id. at 399.
He also effectively applied lessons he learned from Vietnam and vowed to follow four
rules when dealing with the media: (1) Do not be intimidated by the media-military
leaders knew much more about what was happening than the media did; (2) No rule says
that all questions must be answered, especially if-(3) Answering a question might help the
enemy, and perhaps most importantly; (4) Do not lie to the American people. Id,
87. Id. at 400.
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effectively execute this policy-perhaps because they
underestimated the
88
resolve and intelligence of the American public.
In addition, U.S. commanders used the media to its military strategic
advantage. U.S. Central Command, knowing that the Iraqis were blind
and deaf from the Coalition's successful efforts to knock out command
and control systems in Baghdad, manipulated an ignorant media into
providing the enemy with false information. Since the Iraqis were
receiving their only military information from the American media,
American leaders maneuvered reporters to the Kuwait border to cover
a supposed Marine landing that was intended to be a decoy all along."
Meanwhile, American army divisions completed an "end run"around the
Iraqi troops in the West and cut them off from Baghdad.
Ironically, the conflict in Iraq was a crowning achievement for media
technology as well as military technology. Satellite hook-ups enabled the
American public to view live the incredible pictures of devastating
Coalition airpower, precision bombing of strategic military targets, and
the extraordinary scud-busting exploits of the Patriot missiles.' CNN's
ratings skyrocketed, as Americans stayed home from work to view
91
extended live coverage from both sides of a war for the first time ever.
Military generals and political leaders became media darlings; Schwarzkopf, Powell, and Cheney replaced Oprah, Donahue, and Geraldo as the
most watched television personalities."
Meanwhile, the media privately chafed at the restrictions placed upon
them, unable to express outward resentment due to the military's
popularity with the public. Later, Howell Raines of The New York 7mes

88. For example, consider two such occasions. In one, Iraq claimed that the United
States had killed thousands of civilians by bombing a baby milk plant. The media's seizure
of this story and somber portrayal of Iraqi "workers" with white lab coats on that said in
English, "Baby Milk Plant, Iraq* made the press look ridiculous. U.S. military leaders
easily countered this "story" with evidence that this so-called milk plant was indeed a
military installation.
Another situation involved some negative reports about the capabilities of the Patriot
Missile. These speculations stemmed largely from the media's liberal bias. The Patriots
were one of the earliest systems designed by President Reagan's Star Wars program, which
received considerable criticism in the media. Ironically, the media contributed to the
refutation of their cynicism with the stark footage of the Patriots' effectiveness.
89. Richard H. Sinnreich, The ChangingFaceofBattlefieldReporting,ARMY, November
1994, at 30, 34. As Sinnreich notes: "The resulting tactical surprise contributed materially
to one of the quickest and cheapest offensive campaigns in the history of warfare. In the
process, the divorce of the military from the media became complete. To deceive the
enemy, the press itself... was deliberately deceived." Id
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. I&
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The military
lamented that in the Persian Gulf War, "We lost ....
managed us completely.'
Another reporter noted that [tlhe Persian
Gulf was the media's Cannae, and the press played Varro to Schwarzkopf's Hannibal."' Statements such as these demonstrate the state of
competition that exists between the media and the military-a competition that continues today and for the foreseeable future.
The Current Situation
After the Gulf War, the media demanded that the military map out
new regulations for news coverage from battlefields in the future. The
Department of Defense met with some members of the media in 1992 to
create guidelines.' The guidelines sought to allow a more independent
operating structure for reporters covering military operations by cutting
down on press pools, prohibiting military escorts from interfering with
news reports, and offering reporters extended access to soldiers.9
The successful results of the Persian Gulf War, at least from the
military perspective, actually underscored the notion that the media
must not only be controlled for defensive purposes, but that it may also
now be used as an offensive weapon. In the profession of arms, military
commanders can, will, and should exploit any potential weapons,
including the media. From the current state of affairs between the
military and the media, future clashes appear inevitable "between two
equally vital (and stubborn) public institutions.'
K

V. STATUS OF MEDIA'S ABILITY TO GATHER NEWS
A.

General
While the broad language of the First Amendment appears to allow
unrestricted news reporting," the courts have not interpreted it this
way. Instead, this clause has generally been read as prohibiting prior
restraint upon the publication of news or opinions." As time passed,

93. 1& at 30.

94. Id.
95. Office of the As't Secy. of Def. (Public Affairs), Statement of Department of Defense
(DOD) Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, May 21, 1992.
96. Id.
97. Sinnreich, supra note 89, at 34.
98. "Congress shall make no law abridging ... freedom of the press.' U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
99. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, (1907). Justice Holmes wrote that
the primary purpose of the First Amendment was to "prevent all such previous restraints
upon publications,... and... not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
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the Supreme Court addressed specifically the media's right to gather
news and began to place some limitations on it. The defining case of
this area is Branzburg v. Hayes.i°° While noting that protecting the
ability to gather news is important to maintaining freedom of the press,
the Court nevertheless stated that "the First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press." 1" Further, the
press does not have the right to publish anything it desires.' 2 The
conclusion reached by the Court in considering newsgathering was that
the press has no "constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally.""0
A pair of cases, Pell v. Procunier'°4 and Saxbe v. Washington
Post,05 candidly discussed the constitutional protections afforded
newsgathering activities. These cases involved press access to prison
inmates, in which the Court held that the press had no First Amendment right to receive greater access to these individuals than ordinary
citizens.'
The Court noted that "[t]he proposition 'that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to
journalists sources of information not available to members of the public
generally... finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any
° As these cases
decision of this Court.'"'O
suggest, the media's considerable right to gather and report news is not absolute.
B. NationalSecurity or Military Context
The rights of media newsgathering activities in military operations
remain ambiguous and largely unsettled by the judiciary. The two most
recent challenges by the press to the military's authority to restrict
media access ended in the courts' refusal to comment on the merits of
the case due to the problem of mootness.' 0 The latest Department of
Defense (DOD) guidelines do not suggest whether or not the military has
the right to review news stories for national security reasons before they
are published or aired. Two early Supreme Court cases suggest that
prior restraints or access restrictions imposed by the military in times

deemed contrary to the public welfare." Id. at 462.

100. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
101. Branzburg,408 U.S. at 682.
102. Id. at 683.
103. Id. at 684.

104. 417 U.S. 817(1974).
105. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
106. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849.
107. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974)).
108. See Nation Magazine v. Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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of war for security purposes would be appropriateles These decisions,
combined with the preexisting limitations on newsgathering imposed by
the Supreme Court in Branzburg,Pell, and Saxbe, hint that the press
has available very little legal recourse to protest military regulations of
the media. One federal court allowed the Department of Defense to
prevent publication of an article on how to make a hydrogen bomb.110
This decision appears to confirm the main military argument that it
should have broad enough powers to restrain publication of any
information that might be harmful to national security or soldiers'
safety. Such interests arguably outweigh the media's reliance on the
guarantees of the First Amendment and the importance of an informed
citizenry. Thus, even under a strict scrutiny analysis by the courts, the
military could meet the considerable burden of showing that it has a
compelling interest in preventing such publications in order to safeguard
the security of the nation. Such a decision becomes a question of fact
determined on a case by case basis. Certainly, ordinary citizens would
not commonly have access to battlefields upon which American soldiers
are waging wars. As a result, journalists cannot claim a significant
right to such access.
VI. JUDICIAL ROLE IN MILITARY/MEDIA CONFLICT
A.

Separationof Powers

1.
Constitutional Structure. Essentially, the issue is one
involving the foundation of the Constitution-the separation of powers.
The Constitution clearly delineates this separation of powers, leaving the
raising and supporting of armies and navies to the Congress. and
tapping the president as the Commander-in-Chief." 2 The only power
the judiciary has in relation to the military is incidental-interpretation
of the Constitution. This power can emerge when actions of the military
somehow affect constitutional rights. Problems arise when two
fundamental constitutional principles conflict, as they often do in media-

109. See Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
110. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
111. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court has noted that this congressional
power to raise and support armies and make all laws necessary for that purpose is "broad

and sweeping." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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military relations. Which one should yield?1 3 Justice Blackmun
commented on this conflict by noting that the First Amendment is
merely one provision of the Constitution and not necessarily deserving
of superior status. 4 Assuming that what Justice Blackmun said is
true, then the principle of the separation of powers requires deference
on the part of the courts when considering acts by the military
The Founding Fathers envisioned, and indeed established, a limited
government designed to protect fundamental God-given rights such as
life and property. One of the purposes of a central federal government
is to protect these essential natural rights from threats both inside and
outside the nation. The body empowered to implement this role is the
Legislature, and to a lesser extent, the Executive. The Judiciary is
designed to act as a counter-majoritarian influence on these bodies when
they themselves trample on explicit fundamental individual rights as
expressed in the Constitution. No branch of government should seek to
usurp the authority of another and is prevented from doing so by the
structure of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the Judiciary has
overstepped its bounds, especially beginning in the past half-century
with the Warren Court." 5
2. Judicial Restraint. The analysis in favor of judicial restraint,
which has been generally discarded and disregarded today, is based on
sound principles of logic and reason utilized by the Founding Fathers in
the establishment of this Republic. These principles intellectually
oppose the visceral appeals to emotion relied upon by the advocates of
activism. Justice Frankfurter provided perhaps the most eloquent and
brilliant defense of judicial restraint in his dissenting opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.'6 In Barnette, Justice

113. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Burger points out that [o]nly those who view the First
Amendment as an absolute in all circumstances-a view I respect, but reject-can find such
cases as these to be simple or easy." Id.
Clearly, many liberals who formerly viewed the First Amendment as an absolute do not
currently apply such a principle when it comes to unpopular or politically incorrect
viewpoints, such as the current pro-life protests.
114. 403 U.S. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of
unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions.
First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court.' Id.
115. Actually, a strong argument can be made that it was the decision by Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), that paved the way for the current
wave of judicial activism. While the topic of judicial review goes beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is interesting to note that prior to the Warren Court, the Supreme Court was
generally fairly "judicious" in its use of this power.
116. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

1995]

MILITARY VS. MEDIA

999

Frankfurter noted that "blefore a duly enacted law can be judicially
nullified, it must be forbidden by some explicit restriction upon political
authority in the Constitution."n
Justice Frankfurter's prophetic
concern was that judges were beginning to interpret the Constitution
according to their personal feelings and thoughts about a case rather
than focusing upon what the Constitution actually says.
3. Application of Restraint to Military Functions. While
military technology and strategy might have changed drastically since
the adoption of the Constitution, the fact remains that military success
depends upon people-officers, noncommissioned officers and welltrained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines always determine the
outcome of battle. Technology changes, but people do not. As a result,
even proponents of a "living and breathing" Constitution that is
changeable with the times must admit that constitutional provisions
regarding the governing of the military and its actions are just as
appropriate and applicable today as they were in 1789. Understanding
that military power has become more lethal, it is even more important
that the judiciary respect the autonomy of the military and afford the
proper deference in decisions made by military leaders regarding the
armed forces and their operations-actions that affect the security of the
nation.
B. PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
The principle of deference, however, does not necessarily imply that
the judiciary should not "suit up" for the game in these situations; it
only asserts that judges should generally remain "on the sidelines." Of
course, some military actions should never come before the courts
because they are political questions that judges have no authority to
117. Id. at 666 (emphasis added). I would be remiss if I did not point out some other
nuggets from this opinion by Justice Frankfurter. For instance, he noted: "As a member
of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution,
no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard."
Id. at 647. Further, he stated:
[The comprehensive judicial duty and role of this Court in our constitutional
scheme whenever legislation is sought to be nullified on any ground, namely, that
responsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they are directly
to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to determine
whether within the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have
exercised a judgment for which a reasonable justification can be offered.
Id. at 649. Finally, Justice Frankfurter remarked: "[Tlo deny the political power of the
majority to enact laws concerned with civil matters, simply because they may offend the
consciences of a minority, really means that the consciences of a minority are more sacred
and more enshrined in the Constitution than the consciences of a majority.' Id. at 662.
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consider. In fact, probably most military activities, decisions, and
policies would fall under the auspices of the political question doctrine.
The Supreme Court expressly established the potential parameters of
a political question in Baker v. Carr."" In Baker, the Court noted that
cases involving political issues or the protection of political rights do not
necessarily qualify as nonjusticiable political questions. n9 Justice
Brennan commented that such an assertion "is little more than a play
on words."12 ° He also stated that when deciding whether a case is a
political question, the Court should ponder "'the appropriateness under
our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination [as] dominant considerations."'121 Additionally,
he declared that "[tihe nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers."'
The Court
specifically outlined characteristics that would make an issue into a
political question."m Such aspects include an explicit constitutional
delegation of an issue to an alternate branch of government, a shortage
of standards workable or ascertainable by the courts, an inability to
determine without policy decisions earmarked conclusively for judgment
outside of the judiciary, the impossibility of the judiciary's independent
efforts to resolve a question without respecting the other branches of
government, an extraordinary need to respect the political decision of a
different branch, or the possibility of inconsistency and embarassment
as a result of4conflicting proclamations from different departments of
government.1
Application of the political question standard promulgated in Baker
can be troublesome, however, especially when the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction falls under the auspices of foreign affairs and duration of
hostilities-a category that includes military operations. The Court
noted in a 1986 case that the political question doctrine forbids judicial

118. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The petitioners sued the Tennessee Secretary of State,
Attorney General, and state election officials and sought to have a 1901 reapportionment
act declared as unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection. The lower federal
courts found that remedy in this case did not belong with the courts, but the Supreme
Court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the matter, petitioners raised a
justiciable cause of action, and the petitioners had standing to bring the case before the
Court. Id. at 197-98.
119. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 217.
124. Id.
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review of any "controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch."w While
noting that the judiciary ordinarily is unable to reach decisions
regarding national policies with other countries, the Court also cited
Baker for the proposition that courts do have authority to interpret
treaties and executive agreements, as well as the task of interpreting
The Court finally
congressional legislation as a matter of course.'
concluded that despite the fact that the controversy involved an
international treaty with "political overtones," it could not avoid its role
of interpreting statutes and ruled the case to be justiciable. 27
When the military is implicated, the question becomes even more
problematic. One lower federal court refused to consider a case involving
an assertion by an inductee into the armed forces that President Nixon's
decision to mine harbors and bomb targets in North Vietnam was an
impermissible escalation of the war in contravention of explicit
congressional authorization."2 In that case, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that "Ijiudges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking
vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions,
and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably
or appropriately determine whether a specific military operation" would
constitute an escalation of war or a changing tactical decision made
The same court reached an
within a grander scheme of strategy.'
identical conclusion in a subsequent case with a similar issue-the
bombing of Cambodia.' ° The court noted that whether a particular
military action was within the province of the decision-making powers
of the Commander-in-Chief was exactly the kind of factual question
"involving military and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary,
which make the issue political and thus beyond the competence of that
court or this court to determine."'
The analysis of the political question doctrine in relation to the
military differs, however, when the challenge to military action is not
related to its institutional functioning, internal policy making, or
personnel decisions. Media challenges to the military's press regulations
125. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). This
case addressed an international treaty that resulted in the Secretary of Commerce's refusal
to certify the petitioner as having violated the treaty. Id. at 223.
126. I& at 230.
127. Id.
128. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
129. Id. at 1155.
130. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
131. Id. at 1310.
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would fall into this classification. The Court in Baker acknowledged that
if a party could rely upon a constitutional provision that qualifies as a
judicially enforceable right, the courts should consider the case to be
justiciable and outside the realm of the political question doctrine.' 2
By disputing the legitimacy of press regulations by the military; the
media does not raise issues which impact upon the internal operating
structure of the military, its personnel, or its strategy decisions. The
media certainly can assert a judicially enforceable right, namely the
First Amendment guarantees of a free press. This is an area which
obviously does not move beyond traditional spheres ofjudicial expertise.
On the other hand, the judiciary does not have the authority to
establish the specific guidelines that the military ought to follow.
Instead, the courts are limited to determining if the standard press
regulations the military implements are overbroad and violative of the
media's First Amendment rights. Courts may require, if they choose,
that the military abandon far reaching and unspecific regulations that
do not appear to exist for any other purpose than to penalize the press.
The judiciary would extend too far, however, if it were to endeavor to
review specifically tailored restrictions for the press in the battlefield
areas or other restricted zones of military operations. If the military is
able to implement a policy that demonstrates that it is narrowly tailored,
fact specific, and precisely designed for strategic purposes, the judiciary
should be powerless to strike down such a regulation even if it severely
restricts media activity. The reason for these distinctions lie in the
nature of the regulations. Specific restrictions that are drawn in order
to protect the integrity, secrecy, and ultimate success of specific types of
military operations lie within the unique realm of strategic military
decisions which the courts have no business in questioning. As long as
the regulations on their face are not designed merely as punitive
measures against the press or as an intentional destruction of constitutional rights, the judiciary should leave them undisturbed. And let us
be realistic; most military policies are implemented because military
officials believe them to be in the best interest of accomplishing the
essential and dangerous mission given to the armed forces. Whether or
not it is good policy for the military to be highly restrictive of the press
is another question altogether.
C. Media Perspective
The media would argue that the powerful First Amendment guarantees are just the sort of issue the courts should address when those

132. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
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rights are impacted by military action. The First Amendment was
enacted in order to prevent tyranny by a central government over the
people, and vague notions of security are insufficient to abridge that
right. Secrecy within government operations is anathema to a democracy." According to Justice Black, concurring in New York Thnes Co.
v. United States,' the job of the media is to "serve the governed, not
the governors."' This responsibility extends to the duty of preventing
the government "from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.""
The media thus serves as a "watchdog" of sorts over executive powers
that carry much autonomy in the realm of foreign affairs. This media
function is essential in a democratic system. It is a duty recognized
by
37
the Founding Fathers as being of the highest significance.
While recognizing the importance of maintaining secrecy of some
degree of foreign affairs, the media would ask the courts to intervene to
prohibit prior restraints against the publication of such stories, relying
on the traditional tactic of punishing those who disclose unauthorized or
damaging information."8 Prior restraints, however, are permissible,
albeit in a very narrow scope of situations.'3 9
Essentially, First Amendment guarantees of a free press are so
fundamental to the Constitution that any abridgement of that freedom
requires the government to establish a compelling interest for its actions.
Under strict scrutiny, that is an extremely formidable burden to meet
and should not be satisfied by falling back on a general classification of
national security. Journalists would in fact persuasively argue that
national security often will be better served by ensuring that constitu-

133. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (government
official's action for libel based on criticism of his performance).
134. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
135. Id. at 717.
136. Id.
137. According to James Madison:
[T]he great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative as
well as against executive ambition. They are secured, not by laws paramount to
prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the freedom
of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by
the Executive. ... but from legislative restraint also.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (quoting Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
Madison's Works, vol. IV, p. 543).
138. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1952).
139. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). "he objection has been made that
the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such
restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection even as to
previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited." Id. at 714.
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tional rights are not steamrolled by an inattentive (at best) or tyrannical
(at worst) government.
D. Military Perspective
On the other hand, the military relies on the fact that its power to
wage war per congressional declaration is "the power to wage war
successfitfly."' 4 This power requires confidentiality and secrecy. Any
breach is likely to lead to serious casualties at the least, and a threat to
the existence of the nation at the extreme.14 ' As the Supreme Court
noted in Schenck v. United States,' [wlhen a nation is at war many
things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right."' 4 This power to prevent damage to national interests as a
result of publication of information dangerous to national security issues
arises from specific constitutional measures granting power to Congress
to make laws necessary-for operation of the military and to the president
as Commander-in-Chief and architect of foreign affairs.'" Arguably,

140. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (curfew placed by U.S.
military commander on citizens of Japanese ancestry).
141. President Washington, upon refusing to relinquish papers in his possession
regarding the negotiation of the Jay Treaty noted:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often
depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all
the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed
or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious
influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps
danger and mischief, in relation to other powers.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting)
(quoting 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194-95 (1896)).
142. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court affirmed the convictions of defendants who had
violated the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 219. Id. at 52. The defendants had
printed and distributed a newsletter to new military recruits that encouraged them to
disregard the draft and leave the armed forces. Id. at 49. While acknowledging that the
defendants' actions would probably be protected by the Constitution in any other time,
Justice Holmes noted that such activities would not be protected in time of war. Id at 52.
He stated:
[The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done
.... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.
Id. (emphasis added).
143. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
144. See supra notes 111-12.
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in the realm of military operations and the media, prior restraints on the
publication of sensitive military information is the only course of action
that will protect the operation and safety of the soldiers. Punishing
offending journalists after the fact is a little bit like closing the barn
doors after the horses have escaped. Reticence on the part of military
leaders in allowing the media some freedom is understandable in light
of frequent irresponsibility on the part of the press in exhibiting
restraint.
While the First Amendment rights of the press are no doubt vital to
a democratic society, they are by no means absolute.'
"Liberty of
speech, and of the press, is not an absolute right."1' In addition,
"[tihere is no constitutional right to publish a fact merely because it is
true."4 Courts should approach these questions with the ordinary
amount of deference generally attributed to the military While the
government should have to meet the burden of establishing the facts
necessary to permit prior restraints and other media restrictions, courts
should presume that they are legitimate. Military officials are in a far
better position to assess potential security and safety risks to an armed
operation than can a panel of judges sitting safely in the comfort of their
courtroom. The presumption should exist that since military officers
take an oath to "protect and preserve" the Constitution, they will be
loathe to blatantly violate it. Granted, some officers may overstep their
bounds and make unsound judgments. These overreactions, however,
can generally be traced to an attitude held by many soldiers that the
media is not on their side and would betray them for a story. Unfortunately, ever since the Vietnam War, this attitude is understandable and
legitimate. Ironically, the period which exhibited the loosest regulations
of the media was also the worst example of irresponsibility and
dishonesty demonstrated by the military and the government in
American history. Knowing the war was going badly and that they were
losing public support as a result of highly negative news stories, military
leaders fabricated body counts, and politicians refused to allow the
military to wage war in the fashion that would produce victory, due
largely to political pressures at home.
E.

The Problem of Mootness
Whenever these controversies arise between the military and the
press, one factor virtually always comes into play-mootness. The

145. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

146. Id at 708.
147. Id.
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nature of war and other military operations is generally one of remarkable swiftness. The same cannot be said for our legal system. By the
time a particular case winds its way through the courts, the issues have
already ceased to be live controversies reviewable by the judiciary. In
Murphy v. Hunt,1 the Supreme Court defined a case as moot when
the issues "presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome."14 Obviously, most battles and
many wars, especially with today's technology, have long concluded by
the time the case sees the light of day in a courtroom. The particular
media member(s) no longer have an interest in that specific scenario.
Potentially, the mootness problem could be overcome if the issue
involved is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."' ° This doctrine
applies if two prerequisites exist. The first condition is that the
contested action must have been too brief to be completely litigated prior
to its conclusion; the second one is that a "reasonable expectation" must
exist that the party bringing the action could be "subjected to the same
action again.""' While military actions will frequently satisfy the first
prong of the test, the second one is likely to be rare.
Although general regulations of the press by the military are likely to
carry over at least partially from conflict to conflict, and many of the
same media members are likely to be covering the stories again,
application of the regulations will change depending upon the character
of the contest. Because technology changes so quickly and necessarily
alters how the military will prosecute each battle and each war, the
same scenarios are unlikely to repeat. Further, military strategy and
utilization of military power change depending upon the opposition. All
of these factors indicate the extreme logistical difficulties the courts have
in considering these types of disputes, even in the rare cases when the
judiciary has the authority to do so.
R

JudicialDeference
Extreme deference, therefore, appears to best serve the interests of the
nation and its people. The courts, in a litany of cases, have recognized
this principle of judicial deference-even when it comes to competing
52
constitutional rights of the individual. In Goldman v. Weinberger,
the Supreme Court noted that "[olur review of military regulations

148.
149.
150.
(1911).
151.
152.

455 U.S. 478 (1982).
Id. at 481.
Southern Pacific Terminal v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society." ' The Court noted in Parker v. Levy 1 that "for reasons
dictating a different application of First Amendment principles in the
miltary context,... we think that 'the weighty countervailing policies,'
which permit the extension of standing in First Amendment cases
involving civilian society, must be accorded a good deal less weight in
the military context." 155
VII. POSSIBILTY OF PARTNERSHIP?
If the courts are the improper place to resolve the difficulties between
the military and the media, where does that leave the dilemma?
A.

Media Self-Restraint?
Many would prefer that the media "rejoin the team" and abandon the
"neutrality at all costs" stance the press has taken to an extreme,
especially since the Vietnam War. While no one would suggest that the
media relinquish objectivity, much of the hostility between reporters and
soldiers would diminish if the latter could feel confident that they will
not have their backs stabbed by self-serving journalists. Military
officials would feel more comfortable if they knew that the media gave
them the benefit of the doubt and trusted their judgment when they
request that the press sit on a story temporarily for national security
purposes. During World War II, journalists generally assiduously
adhered to principles of self restraint, knowing that the military would
entrust them with the information they needed to know as a result of
their cooperation. At that time, reporters viewed themselves as
"auxiliaries of the armed forces" in a conflict that had sweeping public
support.06
Today, unfortunately, many journalists in the United States apparently have adopted the attitude that they are neutral observers and
reporters first and foremost. The fact that they happen to be American
appears to be of little or no importance. They seem to place the
American public's right to know at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of
morality. Certainly, such a principle is absolutely essential in our
system, and an effective democratic government cannot exist without an
informed citizenry. The problem is that the media's zeal in pursuing

153. Id at 507.
154. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
155. Id. at 760 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973)).
156. Sinnreich, supra note 89, at 32.
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and publishing a story at all costs in order to meet a deadline or receive
a Pulitzer can result in the ultimate cost--the deaths of countless brave
American soldiers. This point cannot be overstated. If parents could be
asked ahead of time whether they would rather find out this week that
their son is dead oi wait until next week, or next year, or the next
decade and discover that he was still alive, the answer would be easy.
For some reason, however, the American media does not appear to be
cognizant of this basic principle.
An example of a journalist who understood and practiced the concept
of partial objectivity (as opposed to neutrality) was the late Mark
Watson, a press corps legend who was the military correspondent for the
Baltimore Sun and had originally started as a youthful reporter for the
Stars and Stripes during the First World War. Lt. Col. (ret.) Richard P.
Taffe related a fascinating anecdote about Watson in a recent military
publication." 7 Taffe tells how Watson was riding with a busload of
fellow journalists on a high-level press trip to Panama.15 The bus
began by taking a roundabout route from Southern Command headquarters to Albrook Air Force Base, but an inexperienced lieutentant ordered
the driver to take a more direct route-right past two open hangars
containing top secret U-2 aircraft.1 59 "Watson stood up and proclaimed: 'Gentlemen, that was not a U-2 we just saw, the United States
doesn't have any U-2s in Panama.'"' Taffe went on to comment that
"[niot a word of that incident ever appeared in print or on the air. I
wonder if that could happen with today's press corps."1 6 '
The answer to Taffe's rumination is probably not, in light of the
comments made and various actions by some of the leading members of
the media today. For example, at a 1987 conference at Columbia
University, famous "60 Minutes" anchor Mike Wallace stated that he
would unhesitatingly accompany enemy troops into battle against
American soldiers in the name of press neutrality.' 2
After the Vietnam War, Boston University professor John Corry
characterized the prevalent and pervasive attitude among the press
favoring neutrality as the "neutrality principle."'
Corry noted that
the press "'passed a turning point in journalism .... The old journalis-

157. Harry F. Noyes, III, Like It or Not, The Armed Forces Need the Media, ARMY, June
1992, at 30, 38.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sinnreich, supra note 89, at 33.
163. Id.
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tic ideal of objectivity has given way to a more porous standard ...
according to [which] reporters may-indeed should--stand midway
between
two opposing sides, even when one of the two sides is their
164
own.'"
The most recent example of the "neutrality principle" put into practice
was during the Persian Gulf War. At that time, Peter Arnett was
caught inside Iraq at the inception of Operation Desert Storm. While his
initial reports seemed independent and objective, Iraqi leaders were able
to exert control over the content and timing of CNN's broadcast and
manipulated the unwitting reporter into serving Iraqi interests. 16
Fortunately, the American public did not take this Iraqi bait, and Arnett
and CNN received enormous criticism for what Americans believed to be
borderline treason.'
Perhaps this experience will teach the media a
lesson in the future. In fact, not only did Saddam Hussein underestimate the resolve and awareness of the American public, the United
States media also miscalculated the intelligence of the people.
Another factor hindering the prospects of future exhibitions of self
restraint by the media is the amount of liberal bias that exists in news
reporting today. The evidence for this situation is exhibited as much by
what is not aired or printed as what is. For example, the press rarely
if ever reports positive news about big corporations, pro-life organizations, opponents of homosexuality, religion, etc. In fact, proponents of
conservative philosophies are frequently portrayed as uncaring, racist,
sexist, bigoted homophobes. The mainstream media is simply out of
touch with the vast majority of American citizens who generally hold
conservative viewpoints. The recent election results overwhelmingly
demonstrate this fact. The most comprehensive survey of both broadcast
and print journalists showed that the percentage of journalists who
support Democratic candidates in elections is never less than 80%.67
Other results from that survey show that Fidel Castro received a more
favorable rating than Ronald Reagan among Columbia University
Journalism graduates, 71% of whom thought that American society is
"alienating" and 50% of whom think that American institutions need to
be overhauled; 68% of all journalists believe that the government ought
to reduce the income gap-in other words, they favor socialism; 57%
believe that America uses resources immorally; and 56%believe that the
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165.
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167.
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Robert Lichter, Linda Lichter & Stanley Rothman, The Lichter Survey, 1986.
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cause of poverty can be traced to American exploitation of Third World
nations.'.
When reporting about social issues, the press oftn trivializes religion
as a tool of the "radical right," promotes alternative lifestyles as healthy
and normal, generally portrays pro-life individuals as extremists and
pro-choice supporters as reasonable and logical despite the fact that a
vast number of Americans oppose abortion for legitimate moral and
religious reasons, and adopts left wing positions and statistics without
question-no matter how ridiculous.
The result of all of this bias is that the media is predisposed to
disliking the military, an American institution known for its general
adherence to traditional conservative values like family, patriotism,
responsibility in conjunction with freedom, discipline, and judgment
based only upon merit. The media delights in discovering and overplaying scandal whenever it occurs in the military--often creating one when
it is not readily apparent. This atmosphere is perhaps an understandable leftover from the 1960s, and many journalists today are products of
that era who refuse to relinquish their distrust of the military.
Unfortunately, as the Lichter study demonstrated, even today's
journalism students have bought into this liberal orthodoxy, so the trend
does not appear to be likely to end anytime soon.
B. Peaceful Coexistence?
Perhaps the responsibility for mending the fences between the two
sides should lie largely with the military, an institution which should
recognize the necessity to win the battle for public opinion. Because the
military continues to enjoy the confidence of the people to a much larger
extent than the press, it should capitalize on this opportunity to
rehabilitate the media to the extent that the military needs the media
to galvanize public support behind any armed conflict. Winning wars
requires more than defeating the other side's army on the battlefield; it
also requires the ability to effectively communicate military, diplomatic,
economic, social and cultural messages as well." 9 Public opinion, both
domestically and worldwide, is needed in order to effectively prosecute
a war. This lesson was truly reflected in the events of the Persian Gulf
War, where American leaders explicitly outlined the who, what, why,
when, and how of the war to the American public, thereby fostering an
environment of trust and understanding. Intelligent use of the Reserve
Forces legitimized the war effort to the average citizen, who undoubtedly

168. Id.
169. Noyes, supra note 157, at 31.
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knew at least one family member, friend, or neighbor who contributed
to the military effort in this way. The principle of the citizen-soldier
went a long way toward winning the favor of the American people, who
would not stand for early media attempts to hype war protests reminiscent of the Vietnam era.
Harry F. Noyes contends that military efforts to unduly burden the
press are counterproductive to the military's ultimate goal. 70 He
claims that the media needs to see (although not interfere with) the
battle in order to credibly communicate the results to the world.171 He
asserts that the media functioned in the Persian Gulf exactly the way
the Founding Fathers envisioned: The free flow and competition for
information illuminated the truth for people worldwide; "truth's superior
merits revealed which facts and ideas to believe; and the diversity of
news and views
convinced most people the news flow was free and
1 72
trustworthy."

Media restrictions, he states, could have ultimately undermined the
credibility of the positive news coming from the theater of operations if
it were not for highly skilled and articulate military leaders who spoke
directly with the American people. The fact that the media was able to
cover stories military officials did not want them to cover-even when
those stories proved to ultimately be false-lent even more credibility to
the favorable stories, and Saddam Hussein's was unable to paint himself
as a sympathetic figure."7 3 An independent media verified the veracity
of military claims of precision hits on Iraqi military installations and
destruction of military targets. The independent media played an
important role in supporting American claims about the minute numbers
of Iraqi citizens' deaths at the Amiriyah incident in comparison with
inflated Iraqi estimates. 174 Further, the media was able to verify that
the target hit in that situation was in fact a military bunker, contrary
to Iraq's claims.'
Noyes claims that if some U.S. officers had had
their way, the media would have been forced not to report from inside
Iraq. If that had been the case, the world would not have learned from
"objective" sources about the accuracy of reports of overwhelming
battlefield victories,7" Hussein's mistreatment of his country's own
citizens, the murders and rapes that took place in Kuwait at the hands
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171. Id. at 33.
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of Iraqi soldiers, the repulsion of scud missile attacks in Israel by Patriot
Missiles, and the significant role of non-American Coalition forces-a
fact which eased the concerns
of Americans who feared that our soldiers
177
had to do all of the fighting.
The fact that all of these claims of the American military were
corroborated by independent media sources known for their skepticism
and bias gave the armed forces extraordinary credibility and helped win
an overwhelming victory in the battle for public support. By restricting
access too extensively, the military runs the risk of emasculating on site
press to the point that editors and commentators sitting in the United
States who know far less than these reporters are able to edit and censor
news to match up favorably with their own agendas.7 8 Noyes concludes his insightful article with the statement that "[the Gulf War
confirms the primacy of public opinion in war fighting and the media's
critical influence on that opinion. If the media can do so much good
when we are trying to thwart them, what might they do for America
with our full cooperation? 17
While many of Noyes' opinions contain a great deal of merit, he
overlooks the fact that the media does not voluntarily present diverse
viewpoints unless presented with inescapable proof. Even then, as was
the case with certain military weapons systems that clearly performed
well in the war, the media still attempted to disparage them as duds.
Amazingly, some journalists attempted to downplay the effectiveness of
the Patriot Missile even after all of America saw its dramatic and
breathtaking accomplishments over the skies of Israel and Saudi Arabia.
How soon they must think we forget. The Patriot was an unmitigated
success and showed that "Star Wars" is not such a farfetched idea after
all. Thus, the competiton for ideas is not quite as ideal as Noyes might
believe.
In addition, one of the lessons of Vietnam was that loose press
restrictions do not necessarily result in truth or admirable conduct by
either institution, especially in light of the liberal media bias discussed
earlier. Clearly, the goals of the military and today's media almost
always conflict. Secrecy, surprise, and unrestricted access to information
are mutually exclusive.

177. Noyes, supra note 157, at 34.
178. Id. at 38.
179. Id.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

The complex nature of the relationship between the military, judiciary,
and the media does not lend itself to an easy resolution. Issues such as
separation of powers, judicial restraint, the public's right to know the
activities of its government, the media's First Amendment rights, and
the importance of secrecy and autonomy in successful military operations
often appear to be mutually exclusive unresolvable controversies. It is
difficult to conceive of an externally imposed solution that would best
balance all of the competing interests. The optimal resolution perhaps
lies in the expectations of responsibility we should demand of individuals
and institutions alike in a democracy. These institutions must all
exhibit some self restraint and discipline when their interests collide.
The media must recognize that it cannot continue to adhere to the
"neutrality principle." The results of the Gulf War should demonstrate
to the media that they "will be treated as [either] allies or adversaries."' ° The best approach would be a reestablishment of a partially
objective standard in the tradition of Ernie Pyle. With the lesson that
information has now become a weapon as powerful as any other, we
cannot expect military officers to keep that arrow in the quiver. If they
do, the opposition will not. Ultimately the media must acknowledge that
"[oln tomorrow's battlefields, there will be no place for neutrals."18 '
STEVEN
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